No impunity for Somali pirates

PM: No impunity for Somali pirates

David Cameron has vowed there would be "no impunity" for Somali pirates as international leaders agreed to tighten the net on the sea raiders menacing international shipping .Britain signed a series of memoranda which will enable pirates captured by Royal Navy warships to be put on trial in countries in the region. The London conference on Somalia, attended by representatives of more than 50 countries and international organisations, also agreed to set up a taskforce to look at ways of eliminating ransom payments to the pirates who demand large sums for the release of ships and crews they seize. The agreements come after Britain announced earlier this week that it was financing the construction of a new £550,000 anti-piracy intelligence centre in the Seychelles to coordinate evidence gathering for use in bringing prosecutions. "Just as there will be no impunity for pirates, there will be no impunity for those who fund them either because of our new centre for coordinating intelligence and pursuing the kingpins of piracy," Mr Cameron told the closing news conference. Earlier, Foreign Secretary William Hague signed a memorandum of understanding with the Tanzanian foreign minister Bernard Membe allowing the Royal Navy to transfer suspected pirates to the east African state for prosecution. He also signed a statement of intent with the Mauritian foreign minister Arvin Boolell to conclude a similar memorandum of understanding by June. Although the agreements only cover pirates held by the Royal Navy, officials said it was a indication of intent on the part of countries in the region. Mr Cameron said the "ultimate ambition" was to end ransom payments and "stop this crime from paying". The racket has become highly lucrative. Over the past five years it is estimated that pirates have collected more than 250 million dollars (£160 million) - with payouts now averaging 5 million dollars (£3 million). The conference, held at Lancaster House, was called by Mr Cameron to try to focus international attention on a country blighted by two decades of chaos, violence and famine and is seen as the new breeding ground for international terrorism. The final communique agreed the need to disrupt the financing and travel of terrorists and to maintain the military pressure on the extremist al Shabaab. (UKPA)

Somali pirate ransoms now $170-million

Somali pirate ransoms now $170-million industry, U.S. threatens sanctions

LONDON — Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on Thursday threatened sanctions on anyone blocking reforms intended to end Somalia’s “hopeless, bloody conflict” and counter militant and pirate groups seen as a growing menace to world security. This comes as it was reported that Somali pirates pulled in $170-million from ransoms in 2011, up from about $110-million in 2010. Addressing a conference aimed at energizing attempts to end more than 20 years of anarchy, Clinton also demanded greater efforts to cut funding for al Qaeda-linked Al-Shabab militants fighting Somalia’s weak Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Al-Shabab is the most powerful of an array of militias spawned by 20 years of conflict in Somalia, where armed groups have a history of wrecking attempted political settlements and perpetuating war, instability and famine. “The position of the United States is straightforward: attempts to obstruct progress and maintain the broken status quo will not be tolerated,” Clinton told the one-day gathering in London of about 40 African, Arab and Western leaders and government ministers. “We will encourage the international community to impose further sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on people inside and outside the TFG who seek to undermine Somalia’s peace and security or to delay or even prevent the political transition.” The increased piracy numbers, as reported by News 24, came from a debriefing from the UN Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) during a Security Council debate on piracy off the Somali coast. UNODC chief Yuri Fedotov said he was not aware of an ideological connection between the pirates and al-Shabaab, but that both added to the general instability of the country. In a statement, Al-Shabab dismissed the London meeting as part of a “concerted Crusade against the Muslims of Somalia” and pledged to fight on to establish Islamic rule. President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed of Somalia’s TFG said Somalis wanted to shake off “horrendous memories of the past” but feared the gathering might be just another diplomatic talking shop. “Today we are looking for security. We are scared,” he said. “We want to know what happened to the resolutions, all those hopes in the past which never saw the light of day and which remain as mere words on pieces of paper?” Clinton and other speakers welcomed a February 17 agreement among Somali leaders on plans for a parliament and constituent assembly to replace the TFG when its mandate expires in August. FRACTIOUS Establishing a legitimate successor government seen as inclusive by the country’s fractious clans would be a vital step in restoring respect for formal politics among Somalis who tend to equate state power with corruption and brutality. In a remark likely to stir attention in Mogadishu, Clinton raised the possibility of what she called “a more permanent diplomatic presence in Somalia” as security improves. U.S. diplomacy is current managed from neighboring Kenya. The United States closed its embassy in Mogadishu in 1991, the year Somalia collapsed into feuding between warlords, clans and factions after president Mohamed Siad Barre was overthrown. Up to a million people have since been killed, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The TFG got a boost on the eve of the conference when the U.N. Security Council voted to increase by nearly half an African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia, seeking to press home a military offensive against Al-Shabab. The resolution expanding the AMISOM force to 17,731 from 12,000 troops and police passed the council unanimously. But some experts worry that the military campaign against Al-Shabab may divert the energies of the TFG, a body widely seen as corrupt, badly managed and riddled with infighting. Clinton said Al-Shabab was weakening but pressure needed to be maintained. “Especially in south central Somalia, it has turned an already bad situation into a nightmare. It has dragged fathers and sons from their homes and forced them to fight in a hopeless, bloody conflict,” she said. British Prime Minister David Cameron told the gathering that a failure to end Somalia’s chaos would endanger international security, arguing that Somalia’s problems “affect us all.” “In a country where there is no hope, chaos, violence and terrorism thrive. Pirates are disrupting vital trade routes and kidnapping tourists,” he said. Cameron announced several aid and development initiatives including a proposal to set up an international taskforce on ransoms, the main tactic used by Somali pirates who seize ships and their crews in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. The meeting’s UK organizers tried to temper expectations, explaining that the aim of the event is to galvanize policymakers’ attention on Somalia to coordinate a sometimes disjointed international response better. Nevertheless, Somalis who have known little but war, famine and blunder-prone international intervention for decades cannot help but hope for something that will improve their lives. “The expectations that Somalis have are huge,” Mogadishu-based civic activist Jabril Ibrahim Abdulle of Somalia’s Center for Research and Dialogue think tank told Reuters. “You have so many external factors driving different agendas that it would be a success to have a unified stance. Above all we need implementation of what’s agreed, as disappointed hopes will only bring more radicalization and hostility.” (Reuters)

UN lauds Seychelles for "lead role" in prosecuting pirates

Seychelles was singled out for praise in the United Nations Security Council for its lead role in prosecuting pirates in the Indian Ocean, at a piracy debate session held yesterday afternoon. The praise, delivered on behalf of UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon and echoed by members of the Security Council, came on the eve of the London summit on Somalia yesterday and which was attended by Seychelles President James Michel, among other world leaders. Speaking for Mr Ban Ki-moon, who was on his way to the London conference, his legal counsel and under-secretary general for Legal Affairs, Patricia O'Brien, described Seychelles' willingness to act as a regional prosecution centre as an important development in the battle against piracy in the Indian ocean. "I would like to take this opportunity to commend the government of Seychelles for this initiative," Ms O'Brien said, while recognising that this was "understandably contingent upon there being an effective post-trial transfer framework in place so that those convicted can serve their sentences in Somalia". Ms O'Brien's statement was later echoed by the representative of the United States which was one of several countries that commended Seychelles. The Security Council was debating a report by the secretary general on specialised anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other states in the region. Pointing out that Seychelles will this year also open a regional anti-piracy prosecution and intelligence coordination centre, Ms O'Brien described this as "a most important development that accords with the emphasis of the Security Council...on the need to prosecute not only suspects captured at sea, but also key figures of the criminal networks who organize and profit from piracy attacks". Yury Fedotov, the executive director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), later reported that pirates received some US $170 million in ransoms for hijacked vessels and crews last year, a 54 per cent increase on 2010. The average ransom in 2011 was about US $5 million, although as much as $10 million was paid for the release of a tanker. Noting that Seychelles and four other states of the region were prosecuting piracy suspects or seriously considering doing so, Ms O'Brien said: "I am most grateful to these states for their...dedication in combating piracy". She added that the secretary general's report reflected "that the states in the region that are conducting piracy prosecutions have taken on a heavy responsibility that entails a commitment of national resources, as well as security risks. "It is key that the international community both acknowledges the important prosecution role that they are playing, and matches their commitment with strong international support and assistance." The UN secretary general's report indicates that of the 20 countries holding and prosecuting Somali piracy suspects, Seychelles is third in convicting the most pirates after Somalia itself and Yemen. (Seychelles Nation website, Victoria)

Syria's Alawites

Syria's Alawites, a secretive and persecuted sect

The revolt against Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, inspired by uprisings which toppled three Arab leaders in 2011, has taken a sectarian slant as most of the protesters trying to topple the president are Sunnis. Assad is from Syria's minority Alawite sect and critics say the president has filled senior political and military posts with Alawites to impose his rule through sectarian loyalty. -- Sunnis Muslims make up 74 percent of Syria's 22 million population, Alawites 12 percent, Christians 10 percent and Druze 3 percent. Ismailis, Yezidis and a few Jews make up the rest. -- The clannishness, secrecy and tenacity of Syria's power elite around Assad have deepened Sunni Muslim suspicions about the enigmatic Alawite faith. -- An oppressed minority for most of their history, Alawites suddenly cemented their control in Syria in 1970 when Assad's father Hafez staged a coup that sidelined the Sunnis. He built a ferocious security apparatus based on fellow Alawite officers. -- Allying with Sunni merchant classes in Damascus and Aleppo, the Alawite elite expanded their influence to the economy as well as the security apparatus and the military. The core of the feared pro-Assad Shabiha militia is Alawite. -- This year's bloody struggle between Assad forces and pro-democracy protesters splits Syria along a minority-majority gulf made deeper by the fact many Sunnis call Alawites heretics. -- Like most Arab countries, Syria has seen conservative Islam spreading in recent decades. This has sharpened Sunni differences with the Alawites, who claim to be mainline Shi'ites and sometimes copy Sunni practices to play down differences. -- Sectarian killings have racked the central city of Homs, and Alawites have been targeted because they were the same sect as the president. Many Alawites live around or in Homs and Hama, another restive city, and the port of Latakia. -- Not all Alawites support the Assad dynasty and only a few have profited from Assad's rule, with many living in poverty in Syria's central mountains. The sect extends north to the Turkish city of Antakya, near the ancient city of Antioch, in Turkey where there are up to 12 million Alawites. -- The Alawite religion is often called "an offshoot of Shi'ism," Islam's largest minority sect, but that is something like referring to Christianity as "an offshoot of Judaism." -- Alawites broke away from Shi'ism more than 1,000 years ago and retain some links to it, including the veneration of Ali, the cousin and son-in law of the Prophet Mohammad. Alawi literally means "those who adhere to the teachings of Ali." -- But several beliefs differ sharply from traditional Islam. Named after Ali, Alawites believe he was divine, one of many manifestations of God in a line with Adam, Jesus, Mohammad, Socrates, Plato and some pre-Islamic sages from ancient Persia. -- To orthodox Muslims, this eclectic synthesis of Christian, Gnostic,  eoplatonic and Zoroastrian thought violates Islam's key tenet that "there is no God but God." -- Alawites interpret the Pillars of Islam (the five duties required of every Muslim) as symbols rather than duties. They celebrate a group of holidays, some Islamic, some Christian, and many Alawite practices are secret. They consider themselves to be moderate Shi'ites. -- Oppressed during the Ottoman period, Alawites have played down their distinctive beliefs in recent decades to argue they were mainline Shi'ites like in Iran. This is partly to satisfy the constitutional rule that the president must be a Muslim. -- The outlawed Muslim Brotherhood called Alawites infidels for decades. Leaders of the Sunni movement no longer say this openly, but nobody knows whether the rank and file is convinced. -- Isolated in the mountains near Syria's Mediterranean coast, Alawites taught that the Koran was to be read allegorically and preferred to pray at home rather than in mosques. -- They were also highly secretive, initiating only a minority of believers into their core dogma, including reincarnation and a divine Trinity, and into rituals including a rite of drinking consecrated wine similar to a Christian Mass. --- French colonial administrators tried to classify Syrian Alawism as a separate religion despite resistance from Alawi leaders who were more interested in identifying with Islam. -- Like the nearby Druze, Alawites adopted the Shi'ite practice of taqiyya, or hiding their beliefs to avoid persecution. "Taqiyya makes a perfect qualification for membership in the mukhabarat, the ubiquitous intelligence/security apparatus that has dominated Syria's government for more than four decades," the British Islam expert Malise Ruthven wrote recently. (Reuters)

Half of Syria no longer under Assad's control, opposition says

Opposition sources also report regime taking away sole responsibility for dealing with uprising from Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Daoud Rajha. Syrian opposition leader Colonel Riyad al-As'ad, commander of the Syria Free Army, said on Wednesday that around half of the country is no longer under the control of President Bashar Assad’s forces.  The Syria Free Army - which has managed to recruit over 25,000 army deserters and citizens so far - has apparently refrained from taking control of more territory out of fear that the regime would respond with more force and yield a significant increasing in the number of casualties.  This is also apparently the reason that the opposition group retreated from the suburbs of the capital Damascus on Sunday, following an attack by regime forces, in which opposition forces were shelled, and fired on by tanks.  Opposition sources have also reported that President Assad has decided to split the responsibilities of his top military officers, taking away from Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Daoud Rajha the sole mandate for dealing with the crisis that has gripped Syria since March last year.  The mandate has passed partly to former Defense Minister Hassan Turkmani, who will be responsible for military operations, while General Jamil al-Hassan will be tasked with repression and arrest of opposition members organizing demonstration in the streets. Two of President Assad’s nephews, Rami Makhlouf and Hani Makhlouf, will be charged with logistics.  Assad’s brother and brother-in-law will be tasked with imposing a blockade on families of the Syrian political establishment, in order to prevent them from defecting. If these reports are correct, they point to a very heavy pressure on Assad, and indicate fear bordering on hysteria as to what is happening in Syria.  Today, despite an increase in the number of defectors, the highest ranks of the military are still loyal to the regime. Some of those who have defected indicate that there are splits among the ranks whose origin is battles of ego within the ranks themselves, as opposed to a real opposition to the Assad regime.  It seems that some of the senior officers who recently defected intend to set up their own headquarters for the defector army, and it is not clear whether the commander of the “Syria Free Army” will join them or whether he will manage “his army” separately.  Violence continued on Wednesday as the opposition reported that at least 20 people were killed by Syrian government forces in a restive area on the outskirts of Damascus.  The deaths in the area of Reef Damascus included six army defectors, Syrian activist Ayman Idlibi told DPA.  Earlier on Tuesday, the Arab League and Western powers said at a UN Security Council meeting they were not seeking military action to end the bloodshed in Syria, in an effort to bring Russia and China onboard for a solution. The high profile council meeting in New York was attended by several government ministers and a high-ranking delegation from the Arab League. (Haaretz)

Hired guns can help to tackle threat of piracy, says minister

Private security contractors could play a valuable role in countering maritime piracy, the British minister for Africa said during a visit to the UAE yesterday. The number of companies offering antipiracy training and protection has soared in recent years due to the rise of the threat, although not without controversy. As long as they are closely regulated, contracted security could be useful at sea and on land in Somalia, said the British minister, Henry Bellingham. Some companies have sought deals with Somalia's regional governments to train local law enforcement officials, while others have placed armed guards aboard ships to ward off pirates. Many companies are registered in Britain and staffed by former military personnel from the UK, US and other countries. The trend has generated debate in shipping, defence and government circles, with some backing the need for effective protection and others fearing the lack of regulation and the threat of escalating violence. Mr Bellingham expressed confidence in the companies. He said they were "setting the highest possible standards" and that British companies - some contracted by his government - were "carefully regulated". He believes they fulfil security needs while the Somali authorities lack the ability to control their waters or crack down on piracy. "You can't just build a navy overnight, and it presupposes you have the facilities for training," he said. "In the meantime, there is a role for private security companies." Contractors have had similar work in the region, including training the navy in Tanzania. Whether Somalia hired companies was their decision, he said. "The most important thing from our point of view is that they are properly regulated," he added. (The National)

India, China, Japan coordinating in anti-piracy operations

India, China and Japan have started implementing a new mechanism to coordinate the movement of their warships in the Gulf of Aden to provide protection to cargo vessels from sea brigands.  the three countries operate independently in the Gulf of Aden to provide protection to cargo ships from pirates and are not part of the two groupings deployed there-- the European EUNAVFOR and the US-led Task Force 151. "Earlier what was happening was that the convoys of all these three countries would be spaced by few hours and there would be long hours in a day when no convoy was available for escorting the vessels," Indian Navy's Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Foreign Cooperation and Naval Intelligence) Rear Admiral Monty Khanna told reporters here.  The officer was holding a briefing on the 'Milan' naval exercise, which started in Port Blair Wednesday. He said now the three countries have "evolved a mechanism under which it will be ensured that there is enough gap between the Indian, Chinese and the Japanese convoy and they are well-displaced" to be able to escort a greater number of ships in a day. Khanna was replying to a query on the lack of coordination and cooperation between the Chinese and Indian navies.  The coordination exercise among the three navies is being held under the 'Shared Awareness And Deconfliction (SHADE)' grouping established in December 2008 for sharing "best practices", and activities of nations involved in counter-piracy operations in the region, officials said.  India deploys at least one warship at any point in time in the Gulf of Aden whereas the Chinese Navy has three warships including a tanker vessel for sustaining its operations there.

(PTI)

Denmark Delivers Four Somali Pirates

Seychelles is, after all, receiving some of the pirates whom the Danish warship Absalon took captive during an operation on 7 January. In all, the islands in the Indian Ocean have agreed to receive four out of a total of 25 pirates who have been in captivity on the Absalon since the liberation operation. In this, Danish frogmen came to the rescue of 14 Iranian and Pakistani hostages on board the Iranian pirate mother ship Tahiri. The 14 had been captives since November 2011. "We are continuing the efforts to assign the remaining 21 suspected pirates on board the Absalon to other countries in the region, with a view to prosecution," Foreign Minister Villy Sovndal (Socialist People's Party) says in a written statement to Politiken.dk. In spite of intense diplomatic efforts on Denmark's part, it so happens that Seychelles refused to prosecute the group of pirates slightly less than two weeks ago, because the archipelago did not have the prison capacity. Of all the inmates in the of Seychelles, 14 percent are Somali pirates. Yet now Seychelles has changed its mind, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports. In the same instance, the archipelago has in fact agreed to prosecute 14 pirates in detention on a British warship. The country has agreed to prosecute the pirates in the expectation that, in the not too distant future, they, along with other pirates serving time on the archipelago, can undergo transportation for imprisonment in their homeland, Somalia, in the autonomous region of Somaliland. "We must understand that the countries consenting to prosecute pirates do not necessarily have the capacity to take care of their imprisonment as well. We therefore support the development of prison capacity in Somalia too, so that, in time, the convicted Somali pirates can undergo transportation for imprisonment there," Sovndal proclaims. Are Handing Over 'the Hard Core' According to accounts from the crew of the Tahiri, the four who will undergo prosecution in Seychelles took part in the Iranian mother ship's initial hijacking. It is they against whom there is the strongest evidence. Military police and lawyers have also compiled cases against the 21 pirates still in detention aboard the warship Absalon. Yet, out of consideration for the negotiations, the Foreign Ministry will not say how long the process of finding countries ready to prosecute the others will be. Experience indicates that possible candidate countries are Kenya and Mauritius. "The bundles of evidence for the remaining 21 are not identical. At the moment, we are primarily trying to secure the assignment of those in detention, who constitute the 'hard core' and against whom the evidence is strongest," the foreign minister proclaims. May End in Putting Ashore He emphasizes, however, that it may be necessary to put all or some of the 21 remaining pirates ashore on the coast of Somalia if "customers" cannot be found. "That would not be any failure. It would not, of course, change the fact that 14 hostages had been freed and 25 pirates taken out of the game. Prosecution is quite central but the commitment to deter, ward off and disarm is, of course, particularly helpful too," Sovndal proclaims. "Then again, we must accept that, if we are to follow 'the path of the law,' we must do it properly. Among other things, this means that the evidence must stand up and that we must sometimes accept that not every detainee can undergo prosecution," the minister says. Time for Prosecution Is Running Out In quite specific terms, the Absalon will leave Seychelles today, after which the four captives, the relevant witness accounts and evidence will be consigned to the local police. Thereafter the archipelago will be responsible for the pirates. The remaining 21 will continue to proceed with the Absalon. How long they can undergo detention without court proceedings is a legal grey area but Denmark met with criticism from a Dutch court in 2010 for holding five pirates captive too long. On that occasion the pirates had undergone detention in cells on the Absalon for five weeks. The 21 currently in detention have been on board for three weeks.

At the moment, more than 1,000 pirates are undergoing prosecution or have received their penalties in more than 20 countries around the world, the Foreign Ministry reports. International Pirate Hunt

The number of piracy attacks has risen sharply in East Africa. Among the Somali sea bandits' Danish victims are a Danish sailing family of two adults and three children along with two crew members. They were released after almost half a year's captivity.

(Politiken)

UAE minister backs improving Somalia's justice system to fight pirates

UAE minister backs improving Somalia's justice system to fight pirates

The UAE assistant minister of security has backed calls for a new international system to make it easier to bring pirates to justice. Faris Al Mazrouei, the assistant minister for security and military affairs at the ministry of foreign affairs, said at today's meeting of a six-nation Contact Group that he hoped a programme could be agreed on, to help Somalia improve its justice system. He told the meeting of senior security officials from Italy, the US, Denmark, UK, Egypt, and Netherlands that "as a maritime nation, the UAE is united in its concern at the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia". Representatives are expected to present and discuss recent developments in their anti-piracy efforts. Mr Al Mazrouei said the UAE's priorities were in the fields of public awareness and outreach, increasing compassionate" support to Somalia, enhancing the region's capacity to respond to piracy, and highlighting the role of education in countering piracy. "We want to spread understanding of the issue and the challenges of responding," he said. "So we can all work together towards solving this problem." The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was created in New York two years ago following a UN Security Council resolution.

(The National)

Somalia

Islamic Development Bank chief, UK minister discuss relief aid for Somalia

Jedda, 1 February - The president of Islamic Development Bank Group, Dr Ahmad Muhammad Ali met in Jedda today [1 February] with British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs Henry Bellingham. At the outset of the meeting, Bellingham commended important developmental roles played by the bank, particularly its success in alleviating the sufferings of the Somali people, noting that his visit aims to coordinate efforts with the Bank to support and promote developmental programmes in Somalia, and stressing his country's interest in restoring stability to this country. He also expressed his desire for coordinating relief and development efforts with the Bank for Darfur region in Sudan and in Nigeria.

Source: SPA news agency website

EU Decline and Chinas Rise

Wounded Giants

Op-Eds/Articles

Uri Dadush L'Espresso, December 30, 2011

The year just ending will no doubt be remembered for the self-immolation of a

Tunisian street

vendor that triggered the Arab Spring. But history may show that a less harrowing episode was even more significant. I am referring to President Sarkozy's late October telephone call to President Hu Jintao to ask for Chinese money in support of the euro rescue, money that the Americans had already said they could not give. Sarkozy’s call symbolized three historic shifts in great power relations: the fragility and endangerment of the European project, the ascendance of China, and the beginning of the end of the American era.

It is tempting to read this chain of circumstances as an aberration, the result of a giant financial crisis that happened to hit the United States and Europe especially hard but will eventually fade. That complacent interpretation, however, ignores the deep fault lines exposed by the crisis in the United States and its allies, and China’s steady and remarkable progress over the last 30 years.

On the other hand, the power shift symbolized by Sarkozy's call is not cataclysmic. It does not, for example, signal the end of the United States as the world's military superpower. Moreover, shifts in great power relations are not new, nor have they invariably been the harbinger of disastrous conflicts. But Sarkozy’s call does mark a rapid decline in America's and Europe's ability to shape world events. And history has repeatedly shown that, even when they are peaceful, such transitions are resisted, breed miscalculations, and can spawn enormous tensions.

In the case of the historic power shift towards China, there are three specific reasons why Sarkozy's call to Hu Jintao should worry everyone, beginning with the Chinese.

First, there is no precedent for a great power to advance as quickly as China has. China's GDP has grown by a factor of about ten in 30 years, a feat that had taken previous emerging powers a century or two. The pace of the transition is compounded by the suddenness, severity, and protracted nature of the financial and sovereign debt crisis that has hit the United States and its traditional allies. Mind-sets, politics, and institutions react with a long lag to economic shifts. There is no ready mechanism for China to help Europe, for example, without upsetting the power balance at the IMF.

Second, China is the country least ready for the transition. For the first time in history, the world's largest economy (China’s GDP is set to overtake the United States in a few years) will be a poor country, one whose per capita income is today about one-eighth that of the United States. This means that China will remain more focused on its own development than on providing global public goods, so the priority it gives to setting carbon emission targets, achieving currency convertibility, privatizing its banks, and bailing out its neighbors (especially the rich ones) will not be what many would wish.

Third, there is the dissonance of values. With all the large liberal democracies in deep trouble, the United States increasingly withdrawn, and China a spectacularly successful one-party state and command economy, which model should countries follow? And in a world where—from Japan to Brazil to Latvia—liberal democracy has become the norm, how could China lay claim to be a leader?

Internationally, the leadership vacuum and the confusion of values will make the reconciliation of disputes more difficult and may tempt the strongest to take risks they would not otherwise take. Domestically, the tenets of economic policy, so long guided by the Washington consensus, will also be challenged, including in China. Its Communist Party has for many years cautiously and steadily steered the economy towards markets, but, with social tensions and inequality surging in China as they are in many other countries, staying the course of reform may become more difficult.

Sarkozy’s appeal for help from China illustrates that there is more at stake in the vehement economic policy disputes in Brussels and Washington than most people realize. The United States and Europe are wounded giants, and their internal unity and return to health is vital for preserving the current international order—to assure peace as well as prosperity. Even the Chinese, in whose direction the power pendulum is swinging, know this.
 

This article originally appeared in L'Espresso.

http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=46381&lang=en

The Middle East’s Multiple Futures

The Middle East’s Multiple Futures

Paul Salem Al-Hayat, January 26, 2012

One year into the Arab Spring the countries of the Middle East are headed in very different directions. In North Africa, the countries of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia are moving toward democratic transition. But the Levant, Syria, Iraq, and Iran face increasing internal and external confrontation. On the edges of the Arab world, Morocco and Algeria are managing to ride out the wave of change, while the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is carving out a zone of its own, putting down rebellions and managing socioeconomic expectations. 

Tunisia has led the way in terms of positive change. The first to rise up in revolt, it has been the first to hold elections and begin a promising post-revolutionary transition to democracy. Egypt is following a slightly different path, but it too has held successful post-revolutionary elections, and the victorious Muslim Brotherhood has emphasized its commitment to individual, civil, and religious liberties. The Brotherhood is likely to be the dominant political party in Egypt for the next decade or more, governing in coalition with various nationalist, liberal, and secular parties. It will also likely share power with the military in a semi-democratic order dominated by a strong Brotherhood-Military axis. 

After a recent visit to Libya, I returned optimistic that, despite the many security and political challenges it faces, Libya is likely to succeed in transitioning toward stability and elected government. There are regional and tribal divisions, but nothing to compare with the deep sectarian and ethnic divisions of the Levant. There is a strong sense of Libyan nationalism, pride about removing the dictator, and wide consensus about the need to move forward with elections, a constitution, and a new government. The tens of thousands of armed rebels pose a serious security risk, but they want jobs not conflict, and the transitional government is already in the process of integrating them into the army and police. 

The eastern part of the Middle East is moving in almost the opposite direction. The Syrian regime is at war with its own people, has refused any form of change or compromise, and is also in conflict with Turkey, the Arab League, and the West. 

The Iraqi government of Nouri al-Maliki, after the U.S. withdrawal, is making use of its accumulated oil billions and the armed forces the Americans built to impose a new authoritarian order, weakening previous Sunni and Kurdish partners, in favor of a Shi’i-dominated central power. 

Tehran is facing a whole range of tensions, and 2012 might indeed bring Iran to the breaking point. Internally, tensions between the regime and millions of its citizens remain unresolved after the mass demonstrations of 2009, and conflict between the camp of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the power of the supreme leader Ali Khamenei remains high. This is exacerbated by economic sanctions that have triggered runaway inflation. And then there are external tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, with Iran on the one side and the United States or Israel on the other—potentially on a military collision course. 

This pattern of internal division and external conflict appears to define an “arc of crisis” from Iran, through Iraq and Syria, and possibly including Lebanon. It carries the risks of regional conflict and internal civil wars. It stands in sharp contrast to the pattern of positive change in Egypt and North Africa, encompassing internal conciliation and accommodation along with external cooperation and global integration. Whether Lebanon can find balance amid the contradictions between these two wings of the Arab world in 2012 remains to be seen. 

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has charted a different course entirely. Unprepared to accommodate the democratic wave of the Arab Spring and worried about the chaos that is engulfing the Levant, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners have intensified their cooperation in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Indeed, the Arabian Peninsula is emerging as an almost separate political zone in the Middle East with its own institutions and dynamics. 

The main challenges will be adding a measure of political reform to the large economic benefits offered to GCC populations. More importantly, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf have to consider ways to save Yemen from further collapse and offer it better integration with their own wealthy economies and with GCC institutions.  Just as West Germany helped stabilize most of Central and Eastern Europe, Saudi Arabia and the GCC should be able to at least help integrate and stabilize Yemen.

Indeed, 2012 might be as tumultuous as 2011. While the revolutions of 2011 in North Africa move toward stabilization and transition, in the eastern Middle East, there could be darker headlines of internal conflict and regional war.

This article was originally published in Arabic in Al-Hayat .

http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=47122&lang=en

Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria

Russia's Line in the Sand on Syria

Op-Eds/Articles

Dmitri Trenin Foreign Affairs, February 5, 2012

Syria is often called Russia’s last remaining ally in the Middle East, and Moscow’s continuing refusal to support the United States, the European Union, and the Arab League in condemning the Assad regime certainly appears to support that claim. The reasons cited for Russia’s allegiance to Damascus are many: Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are said to have a sort of autocratic solidarity, with Putin afraid that the Arab Spring encourages challenges to his own rule; at the same time, Russia is thought to have major economic interests in Syria, including arms contracts, a Russian-leased naval base, and plans for nuclear energy cooperation.

There are elements of truth in all these assertions -- but they offer only glimpses of the broader picture. Moscow’s position on Syria is shaped even more by the recent experience of Libya, strong doubts concerning the Syrian opposition, and suspicions about the motives of the United States.

Damascus was Moscow’s ally in the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was engaged in a confrontation with the United States, Israel, and “imperialism” writ large. Under Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, the Soviets equipped and trained the Syrian military. Although the elder Assad was difficult to control and managed to get more from the Kremlin than the other way around, he could be relied upon not to bolt to Washington’s side, as did Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Beginning in 1973, after Egypt’s disastrous defeat in the war against Israel and Sadat’s embrace of U.S. mediation, Syria became the centerpiece of the entire Soviet position in the region, remaining so through the end of the Cold War.

The Russia that emerged from the Soviet collapse had hardly any geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East. In 1972, preparing for his political break with Moscow, Sadat sent home 20,000 Soviet military advisers and their dependents. Four decades later, in February 2011, as Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, was toppled, some 40,000 Russian vacationers were stranded in the Egyptian cities of Hurghada and Sharm el-Sheikh. This, in a nutshell, reveals the difference between the Soviet and Russian involvement in the Middle East: A region where the Soviets once showed off their military muscle and influenced political developments had become a place for ordinary Russians to go for a visa-free budget vacation and a suntan.

Syria somewhat bucked this trend: Its continued relationship with post-Soviet Russia was largely due to the fact that Syria needed arms and Assad did not trust the United States. Today, Russia’s material interests in Syria are real, though limited. Damascus continues to purchase a wide range of Russian arms, from tanks to aircraft and air defenses, but Syria does not represent a big or particularly lucrative market for these exports. In order to sell its armaments, Russia has had to extend credit to Syria and forgive Damascus its multibillion-dollar debt to the Soviet Union. When Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Damascus in 2010, he offered to build a nuclear reactor in Syria, but that work has not even started. And Moscow maintains a naval resupply facility at the Syrian port of Tartus, which it last used a few weeks ago, when the Russian navy’s only aircraft carrier was sailing from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. These bilateral interests are supported by the personal connections between Russian military officers, arms traders, and diplomats and senior members of the Assad regime.

But these shared interests are not the only reasons why Russia has been unwilling to join the West in condemning Assad at the UN Security Council. Moscow has learned its lesson from how events unfolded in Libya last year. It abstained during the crucial UN vote on intervention in Libya, thus allowing the adoption of the resolution calling for a no-fly zone over Libya, which was meant to prevent an impending massacre in Benghazi. The Russian government wanted to help its partners in the United States and Europe, whom Russia needs for its plans for economic modernization. To be sure, Russia did have some material interests in Libya -- contracts for military arms and railroad contracts -- but it certainly did not want to be seen as Muammar al-Qaddafi’s defender.

The NATO no-fly zone soon led to an offshore war against the Qaddafi regime. As Russian officials argued, vicious as the Qaddafi government may have been, the war’s long agony resulted in a number of deaths among civilians, if not so much in Benghazi, as once feared, then in Tripoli and in Qaddafi strongholds such as Sirte. As Moscow sees it, the foreign militaries that intervened bear at least some responsibility for those deaths. And so far, the new Libyan regime has proved far less secular than the one it replaced, with some of its leaders suspected of having links to al Qaeda. It also has been unable to control Qaddafi’s abandoned arsenals, or even preserve unity in its own ranks. What was billed as a revolution seemed to many in Moscow to be a civil war that replaced a dictatorship with chaos.

But Libya has always been peripheral to Middle Eastern geopolitics. Syria, however, is different. A civil war there, which has in effect already begun, could unsettle the entire region, above all in Lebanon but also in Jordan and Iraq. Israel, too, may be affected should Damascus encourage Palestinian militants or Hezbollah fighters to attack Israeli settlements or outposts. Iran, Syria’s ally, is already being drawn into the fray, with the Assad regime’s Alawite core coming under attack from mainly Sunni opposition. Syria is Bahrain in reverse -- a Sunni majority that feels oppressed by a relatively small sect that many believe is closer to the Shiites. Recent events in Syria and Bahrain have caused the regional divide between Sunnis and Shiites to become more pronounced, heralding a possible clash between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As strategists in Moscow see it, the conflict in Syria, the sectarian violence in Iraq, and the aborted revolution in Bahrain are the proxy battlefields where the struggle for regional primacy is being fought.

As a result, where much of the Western world now sees a case for human rights and democracy, and where the Soviets in their day would have spotted national liberation movements or the rise of the masses, most observers in Moscow today see geopolitics. Russian government officials and commentators close to them explain Western behavior in rather cynical terms: Washington let go of a long-time ally, Mubarak, in order to retain influence in Egypt, waged a war in Libya to keep oil contracts, and ignored the Saudi intervention in Bahrain because the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based there. And now, the United States is trying to topple Assad to rob Iran of its sole ally in the Arab world. The Russians themselves have no dogs in these fights, but they do not want to bandwagon on a U.S. regional strategy that they believe is a losing and dangerous proposition.

For all their outward coolness, Russia’s foreign policy strategists continue to be preoccupied with the United States, watching its every move. They were unpleasantly surprised when the United States decided to intervene in Libya and are now suspicious of U.S. plans for Syria. The Kremlin is concerned about a war between the United States and Iran, which is visibly drawing closer. Moreover, with all the problems Moscow faces in the perpetually troubled North Caucasus (and the threat of violent destabilization it may one day face in Central Asia), Russia does not relish the prospect of more conflict in the Muslim world should the United States -- alone or with its allies -- strike again in the Middle East. The forthcoming U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the likely return of the Taliban to Kabul already present enough worries.

Russia is not blameless: It lost too much time watching others and then criticizing them without shaping an active role for itself. Late last month, Moscow invited the Syrian government and the opposition for talks. This move came much too late. The opposition wants to hang Assad, not negotiate with him. Perhaps last year the response might have been different.

Yet Moscow chose not to use even the limited influence it had with its supposed ally in Damascus. Inaction has had its price: Over the last year, Russia has faced the simultaneous opprobrium of the Western public, the Arab street, and the conservative Gulf regimes. And now it has maneuvered itself into a position in which it must bet on Assad’s survival to protect its interests. Moscow needs to learn that saying no is not good enough and that in global politics timing is everything.

This article originally appeared in Foreign Affairs.

Reprinted by permission of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, February 5, 2012. Copyright 2012 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=47096&lang=en

China's Veto on Syria: A View from China

China's Veto on Syria: A View from China

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Yan Xuetong Sohu, February 8, 2012

China exercised its veto twice within five months to block the United Nations (UN) Security Council from passing a resolution on Syria. Out of the fifteen members of the UN Security Council, thirteen countries voted for the resolution. Only China and Russia exercised their veto powers.

Many people think that Beijing’s decision is bad for China. China’s international image will be tarnished, they say, and Beijing will offend both Arab and Western countries. China’s diplomacy has been gradually maturing and developing, but why did Chinese foreign policy makers, who were well aware of the disadvantages, still decide to veto the resolutions?

China has nothing to gain from supporting the resolution drafted by the UN Security Council. If China and Russia supported the resolution, rebel groups would come to power quickly in Syria. However, though those rebel groups would appreciate Western countries for their substantive military assistance, they would not think China and Russia provided valuable political support. The Arab League would also believe that the Chinese and Russian stance was only driven by trends in the international community. The league would not thank China for its support either.

In Libya, China supported the idea of economic sanctions proposed by the Arab League and did not veto the resolution that set up a no-fly zone. But the Arab League and Arab countries did not express any appreciation of China’s position; instead they thanked Western countries.

Furthermore, although Beijing did not oppose Western-led action in Libya, China was not praised in the Western media. It was rather labeled an irresponsible country, since it abstained during the vote on the resolution and did not participate in the “real” action of fighting the Qaddafi regime.

The veto is also not going to have any substantive effect on China’s international image. The Chinese Communist Party is the sole party in power in China, so regardless of Beijing’s stance on Syria, the international community, dominated by Western countries, would continue to think China is an undemocratic country that does not respect human rights. Beijing’s veto simply means that the Western world is disappointed in China once again.

And even if Beijing had voted for the resolution, the Arab world would not support China, despite China’s support for some Arab issues. For example, when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, China has provided long-term support for Arab countries. America, meanwhile, has stood behind Israel. However, when there is a conflict between China and the United States, Arab countries do not initially take China’s side. They still support the United States in its war against Iraq, for example, despite U.S. support of Israel.

China will actually benefit from its veto in a number of ways:

First, China’s veto strengthened its strategic cooperative partnership with Russia. For China, the importance of Russia’s strategic support was greater than that of the collective support from 33 Arab countries. And strategic cooperation with Moscow helps China’s position in East Asia. Aligning with Arab world would not produce such a result.

Second, if the crisis in Syria continues, the risk of a war triggered by Iran’s nuclear program will be postponed. That would mean that China could continue to receive oil from Iran and thus not face oil shortages in the future. And as long as the Syrian crisis is not resolved, it will be difficult for America to determinedly support an Israeli military strike against Iran.

Third, Western and Arab countries alike will realize that China’s support is important and essential in Middle Eastern affairs. Beijing’s veto shows the world that China is an important world power whose voice should not be neglected.

Finally, Western countries often think that China’s foreign policy only serves China’s own interests. Beijing’s veto could change the international opinion that China is an irresponsible country because China has no substantial interests in Syria. On the contrary it helps China to create an international image of nation with principle.

If Western countries experience further complications in addressing the Syrian crisis, this will limit their ability to contain China.

In short, China would not have benefited from voting for the UN resolution on Syria and the harm caused by Beijing’s veto is not serious China has actually benefited in a number of ways.

This article was originally published on Sohu.

http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=47217&lang=en